India's Constitution, though federal in structure, inherently possesses centralising tendencies, a deliberate design choice by its framers to safeguard national unity and integrity, especially during crises. This unitary bias becomes particularly evident when examining legislations like the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, the Disaster Management Act, 2005, and the recently repealed Farm Acts.

The Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, a colonial-era law, empowers the Union government to take extraordinary measures, including travel restrictions and health protocols, overriding state actions during public health emergencies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Centre invoked this, issuing nationwide lockdowns and guidelines, effectively centralising the response, with states largely acting as implementing agencies.

Similarly, the Disaster Management Act, 2005, vests significant powers in the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) headed by the Prime Minister. It enables the Centre to formulate national plans, issue guidelines, and direct state disaster response, as seen during major floods or cyclones. This central command structure ensures coordinated action, but undeniably diminishes state autonomy in such situations.

Even the now-repealed Farm Acts demonstrated this centralising impulse. Although agriculture is a State List subject, the Centre legislated on it, citing entries like "trade and commerce." This move, despite its stated intent of agricultural reform, was widely perceived as an encroachment on state legislative domain, highlighting the Centre's willingness to use its concurrent powers or interpret entries broadly to push national policies, even if it sparks federal tension.

These instances collectively showcase the Indian Constitution's flexible federalism, where the Union can assert dominance to address national challenges, prioritizing collective unity and integrity, sometimes at the expense of typical federal distribution of powers.