This statement perfectly encapsulates the radical shift in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, marking a profound transition from his early to his later views.

Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus):
In his early work, Wittgenstein sought an "ideal language" with a "precise logical structure." He believed language functioned as a picture of reality; propositions derived their meaning from mirroring or representing facts in the world. The aim was to reveal the underlying logical form of language, which he thought would correspond directly to the logical structure of reality. Meaning was tied to referential accuracy, and vagueness was seen as a flaw to be eliminated by formal logic.

Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations):
His later philosophy explicitly rejects this quest for an ideal, fact-referring language. The given statement directly reflects this change. Wittgenstein realized that language is far too diverse and context-dependent to fit a single logical structure. He argued that we should look "empirically, to the ways in which languages are actually used."

For later Wittgenstein, "meaning is use." The meaning of a word or sentence is not a hidden essence or a picture of a fact, but rather how it functions in specific social contexts, within what he called "language games." These are forms of life where language is inextricably interwoven with human actions and practices. For example, the meaning of "water" differs when you're performing a scientific experiment, ordering in a restaurant, or shouting for help after falling overboard. There is no single, ideal definition; rather, its meaning is determined by its practical application in diverse "forms of life." This shift transformed the study of language from a logical puzzle into an examination of social practice.