At its second session in 1950, the ILC adopted a formulation of seven Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
* Principle I : Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. This is based on the general rule that international law may impose duties directly on individuals.
* Principle II : The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an international crime does not relieve the person who committed the act from international responsibility. This implies the "supremacy" of international law over national law.
* Principle III : The fact that a person acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
* Principle IV : Acting pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
* Principle V : Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law
* Principle VI : sets out the crimes punishable under international law:
* Crimes against peace : Includes planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, as well as participation in a conspiracy for these acts. The ILC understands the term "waging of a war of aggression" to refer only to high-ranking military personnel and high State officials. The Tribunal affirmed the illegality of aggressive war based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
* War crimes : Violations of the laws or customs of war, such as murder, ill-treatment, deportation, killing of hostages, and plunder.
* Crimes against humanity : Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, when done in execution of or in connection with a crime against peace or a war crime. These acts may constitute crimes against humanity even if committed by the perpetrator against their own population.
* Principle VII : Complicity in the commission of any of the crimes listed in Principle VI is a crime under international law.
The ILC also considered the General Assembly's invitation to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes. While some members questioned its effectiveness, particularly for grave international crimes, others argued that the creation of such a jurisdiction was desirable as an effective contribution to world peace and security, serving as a deterrent against aggressors. (496 words)
(Summary of the Principles of International Law recognize recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries 1950 based on the Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its second session, in 1950)
The International Law Commission (ILC), following a directive from the General Assembly, was tasked with formulating the principles of international law that were recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. This task, undertaken around 1950, aimed to codify these fundamental legal concepts.
The ILC established seven principles. Notably, Principle VI of these principles outlines specific categories of crimes punishable under international law, including crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
According to Principle VI, crimes against humanity were defined to include acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts or persecutions. However, a crucial condition was attached to these acts:
This condition means that acts like murder or persecution, while serious, could only be prosecuted as crimes against humanity if they were directly linked to or part of larger crimes like wars of aggression or war crimes.
The question focuses on why the Nuremberg Tribunal faced limitations in declaring acts of persecution and murder committed in Germany before 1939 specifically as "crimes against humanity." Let's examine the options in light of Principle VI:
The text, through Principle VI, clearly lists "persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds" as acts that fall under the definition of crimes against humanity. Therefore, persecution itself was recognized as a component of this crime. This makes the statement that it was 'not yet recognized' incorrect.
This option suggests that the primary difficulty was proving that the pre-1939 acts of persecution and murder were committed "in execution of, or in connection with, a crime within the Tribunal's jurisdiction" (specifically, a crime against peace or a war crime, as per Principle VI). Given that the war began in 1939, establishing a direct link between earlier domestic persecutions and the subsequent outbreak of war or specific war crimes could have presented significant evidentiary challenges for the Tribunal.
The definition in Principle VI required this connection to be proven. If the prosecution could not satisfactorily demonstrate this linkage for acts committed prior to the war, the Tribunal would be constrained from prosecuting them under the specific heading of 'crimes against humanity' as defined.
The definition of crimes against humanity in Principle VI does not explicitly state that acts committed before the war's outbreak are excluded. The constraint arises from the proof required (the connection to other crimes), not from a blanket exclusion based on the timing alone. Therefore, this option is not the primary reason.
Principle I of the ILC formulation explicitly states that "any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment." This principle is based on the understanding that international law can impose duties directly on individuals. Thus, the idea that international law imposed duties only on States at that time, relieving individuals of responsibility for these crimes, is incorrect according to the principles recognized.
Based on the definition provided in Principle VI and the requirement for a connection to crimes against peace or war crimes, the most accurate reason for the Tribunal's constraint is the difficulty in proving that the acts were sufficiently linked to the Tribunal's jurisdiction. This aligns with the established legal framework and the challenges of prosecuting historical events.