At its second session in 1950, the ILC adopted a formulation of seven Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal.
* Principle I : Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment. This is based on the general rule that international law may impose duties directly on individuals.
* Principle II : The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an international crime does not relieve the person who committed the act from international responsibility. This implies the "supremacy" of international law over national law.
* Principle III : The fact that a person acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.
* Principle IV : Acting pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
* Principle V : Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law
* Principle VI : sets out the crimes punishable under international law:
* Crimes against peace : Includes planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, as well as participation in a conspiracy for these acts. The ILC understands the term "waging of a war of aggression" to refer only to high-ranking military personnel and high State officials. The Tribunal affirmed the illegality of aggressive war based on the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
* War crimes : Violations of the laws or customs of war, such as murder, ill-treatment, deportation, killing of hostages, and plunder.
* Crimes against humanity : Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhuman acts or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, when done in execution of or in connection with a crime against peace or a war crime. These acts may constitute crimes against humanity even if committed by the perpetrator against their own population.
* Principle VII : Complicity in the commission of any of the crimes listed in Principle VI is a crime under international law.
The ILC also considered the General Assembly's invitation to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes. While some members questioned its effectiveness, particularly for grave international crimes, others argued that the creation of such a jurisdiction was desirable as an effective contribution to world peace and security, serving as a deterrent against aggressors. (496 words)
(Summary of the Principles of International Law recognize recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries 1950 based on the Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its second session, in 1950)
The International Law Commission (ILC), tasked by the UN General Assembly, formulated the principles of international law recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment. These principles aimed to clarify individual responsibility under international law, particularly in cases involving acts of aggression and war crimes.
Principle IV of the Nuremberg Principles, as formulated by the ILC, addresses the defense of "superior orders." This principle states:
However, the ILC's formulation added a crucial qualification to this rule.
The question asks how Principle IV of the ILC's formulation differs from Article 8 of the Nuremberg Tribunal Charter. The provided text for the ILC's Principle IV includes a specific condition:
"Acting pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him."
This clause, "provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him," is the significant addition made by the ILC in its formulation of Principle IV. It clarifies that while acting under orders might be a factor, it does not automatically absolve an individual if they had the possibility to exercise moral judgment and refuse the order.
Therefore, the main difference lies in the explicit inclusion of the condition regarding the possibility of making a moral choice.