1. It is fallacious to take any knowledge claim (jñāna) as absolute.
2. To recognize that all knowledge claims are contextually and partially true does not lead to skepticism.
The question describes a philosophical stance where knowledge claims are considered neither absolute nor universally valid. It also states that recognizing this partial truth does not result in skepticism. This perspective aligns closely with the core tenets of Jainism, particularly its doctrines of anekāntavāda and syādvāda.
The two points mentioned in the question can be directly mapped to Jain philosophy:
Anekāntavāda directly supports this. It posits that reality has countless facets, and any single jñāna (knowledge claim) can only grasp a limited number of these facets. Therefore, no knowledge claim can be considered absolutely true or comprehensive.
Syādvāda addresses this. By asserting that every viewpoint holds a degree of conditional truth ("syāt"), Jainism avoids falling into nihilism or extreme skepticism. It doesn't deny the possibility of knowledge but affirms that knowledge is always partial and context-dependent. This nuanced approach allows for meaningful discourse and understanding without claiming absolute certainty.
Therefore, Jainism is the school of classical Indian philosophy that asserts these views on knowledge claims.