DIRECTIONS for the question:The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.

Humans today make music. Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail after this bald statement: that only certain humans make music, that extensive training is involved, that many societies distinguish musical specialists from nonmusicians, that in today’s societies most listen to music rather than making it, and so forth. These qualifications, whatever their local merit, are moot in the face of the overarching truth that making music, considered from a cognitive and psychological vantage, is the province of all those who perceive and experience what is made. We are, almost all of us, musicians — everyone who can entrain (not necessarily dance) to a beat, who can recognize a repeated tune (not necessarily sing it), who can distinguish one instrument or one singing voice from another. I will often use an antique word, recently revived, to name this broader musical experience. Humans are musicking creatures…….

The set of capacities that enables musicking is a principal marker of modern humanity. There is nothing polemical in this assertion except a certain insistence, which will figure often in what follows, that musicking be included in our thinking about fundamental human commonalities. Capacities involved in musicking are many and take shape in complicated ways, arising from innate dispositions ……. Most of these capacities overlap with nonmusical ones, though a few may be distinct and dedicated to musical perception and production. In the area of overlap, linguistic capacities seem to be particularly important, and humans are (in principle) language- makers in addition to music-makers — speaking creatures as well as musicking ones.

Humans are symbol-makers too, a feature tightly bound up with language, not so tightly with music. The species Cassirer dubbed Homo symbolicus cannot help but tangle musicking in webs of symbolic thought and expression, habitually making it a component of behavioral complexes that form such expression. But in fundamental features musicking is neither language- like nor symbol-like, and from these differences come many clues to its ancient emergence.

If musicking is a primary, shared trait of modern humans, then to describe its emergence must be to detail the coalescing of that modernity. This took place, archaeologists are clear, over a very long durée: at least 50,000 years or so, more likely something closer to 200,000, depending in part on what that coalescence is taken to comprise. If we look back 20,000 years, a small portion of this long period, we reach the lives of humans whose musical capacities were probably little different from our own. As we look farther back we reach horizons where this similarity can no longer hold — perhaps 40,000 years ago, perhaps 70,000, perhaps 100,000. But we never cross a line before which all the cognitive capacities recruited in modern musicking abruptly disappear. Unless we embrace the incredible notion that music sprang forth in full-blown glory, its emergence will have to be tracked in gradualist terms across a long period.

This is one general feature of a history of music’s emergence……. The history was at once sociocultural and biological……. The capacities recruited in musicking are many, so describing its emergence involves following several or many separate strands.

The question asks which statement is supported by what the passage says about how musicking emerged.

Paragraph 4 states: “If we look back 20,000 years, a small portion of this long period, we reach the lives of humans whose musical capacities were probably little different from our own.” The statement that, 20,000 years ago, human musical capacities were not very different from today’s restates this directly, so it is a valid argument about music’s emergence.

The statement about anyone who can perceive and experience music is not about emergence at all; it concerns who counts as a musician today. It also overstates the author, who says “almost all of us” are musicians and lists specific abilities (entraining to a beat, recognising a tune).

The claim that all musical work lies in the overlap between linguistic capacity and music production distorts paragraph 2, which says most musicking capacities overlap with nonmusical ones, “though a few may be distinct and dedicated to musical perception and production”, and that linguistic capacities are only “particularly important” within that overlap.

The claim that musicking shares the quality of being a form of expression is not made: paragraph 3 says that “in fundamental features musicking is neither language- like nor symbol-like”, and it is humans as symbol-makers who tangle musicking in “webs of symbolic thought and expression”.

Hence, the answer is 20,000 years ago, human musical capacities were not very different from what they are today.

A keyword set must capture the passage’s central subject and the main ideas it develops, not words that occur only in passing.

Humans — the passage opens with “Humans today make music” and keeps returning to what humans are (musicking, language-making, symbol-making creatures).

Musicking — the author revives this “antique word” to name the broad musical experience and builds the whole argument around it (“Humans are musicking creatures”).

Linguistic capacities — paragraph 2 says that in the area of overlap “linguistic capacities seem to be particularly important”.

Symbol-making — paragraph 3 begins “Humans are symbol-makers too” and contrasts symbol-making and language with musicking.

Modern humanity — musicking is called “a principal marker of modern humanity”, and paragraph 4 ties its emergence to “the coalescing of that modernity”.

So the first set maps onto every paragraph. The set with “Cognitive psychology” and “Antique” picks up incidental words: the passage only mentions a “cognitive and psychological vantage” once, and “antique” merely describes the word musicking. The set with “Psychological vantage” and “Cassirer” likewise rests on passing references (Cassirer is cited for one coinage). The set “Humans; Capacities; Language; Symbols; Modernity” leaves out musicking, the passage’s central term, and its words are too general to identify this passage.

Hence, the answer is Humans; Musicking; Linguistic capacities; Symbol-making; Modern humanity.

The “bald statement” is the plain assertion “Humans today make music.” The author then lists the qualifications that might trail after it: only certain humans make music, extensive training is involved, societies distinguish specialists from nonmusicians, most people today listen rather than make music.

He immediately says: “These qualifications, whatever their local merit, are moot in the face of the overarching truth that making music … is the province of all those who perceive and experience what is made.” So he admits the caveats may have some merit but insists the basic statement holds. That is exactly the reading that, although there may be many caveats, the statement is essentially true.

The reading that a bald statement is one trailed by qualifications reverses the meaning: “bald” means plain and unqualified, and the qualifications are what the author asks us to look beyond.

The reading about giving free reign to musical expressions brings in an idea the passage never discusses; the extract is about the truth of a claim, not about musical freedom.

The reading that a bald statement needs no qualifications to infer its meaning misses the point: the author concedes that qualifications can be attached; his point is that they do not overturn the statement’s truth, not that its meaning is self-evident.

Hence, the answer is Although there may be many caveats and other considerations, the statement is essentially true.

The author’s claim that “Humans are musicking creatures” rests on musicking being a shared, built-in human trait: it is “a principal marker of modern humanity”, belongs among “fundamental human commonalities”, and its capacities arise “from innate dispositions”. Making music, “considered from a cognitive and psychological vantage”, is said to belong to almost everyone.

If musical capacities were primarily socio-cultural, music would be something particular societies produce and pass on rather than a capacity common to the species. That undercuts the idea that musicking defines humans as such, so this statement weakens the claim. (The passage itself says the history was “at once sociocultural and biological”; making it primarily socio-cultural removes the biological, universal basis.)

The statement that musicking is neither language-like nor symbol-like and therefore much older agrees with paragraph 3, which says that from these differences “come many clues to its ancient emergence”. It supports the author rather than weakening him.

The statement that nonmusical capacities matter far more for survival is irrelevant: the author does not claim music is the most important capacity, only that humans universally have it. Something can be a shared human trait without being vital to survival.

The statement that musicking arises from unconscious rather than conscious dispositions fits the passage’s phrase “innate dispositions”; whether the dispositions are conscious or not does not affect whether humans are musicking creatures.

Hence, the answer is Musical capacities are primarily socio-cultural, which explains the wide diversity of musical forms.